For a growing number of Thai businesses and workers, a handful of apps now stand between them and their customers. A restaurant in Ari may take more orders through delivery platforms than through its front door. A driver in Chiang Mai may depend on one app for most of the week’s income. When a platform reaches that position, the terms it sets begin to function less like ordinary commercial pricing and more like the conditions of access to a market.
The Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) is now confronting that problem directly. On 19 October 2026 it approved, for public consultation, a draft notification on the fees charged by ride-hailing and on-demand delivery platforms. The draft does not set a commission rate. Its purpose is to require platforms with market power to explain how their charges are calculated and to justify changes to them.
That choice reflects a difficult balance. Regulators want to stop a dominant platform from dictating terms to drivers, riders and restaurants, while preserving the competition and investment that made these services valuable in the first place.
Two developments have since sharpened the picture. The TCCT had already used its order-making power under Section 60 of the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 (2017) to bar six platforms (Grab, LINE MAN, Bolt, Shopee, Lazada and TikTok Shop) from raising their commission and other fees for six months from August 2026. On 2 November 2026, two major delivery platforms were reported to have filed suit against the commission, arguing that the proposed fee rules exceed its powers under the Act. The draft is therefore moving forward under a temporary freeze and a legal challenge at the same time.
What the TCCT has proposed
The draft is at consultation stage and is not yet law. It follows work that began earlier this year, when a TCCT subcommittee approved in principle a set of service standard requirements for ride-hailing and on-demand delivery platforms and invited public comment on issues such as order batching, distance calculation and GP charges. The commission had noted that its 2020 food delivery guidelines did not reach ride-hailing or the wider range of delivery services, and that several operators had left the Thai market in recent years, including foodpanda.
The reported timetable for the fee notification is as follows. These dates are targets and may move as the consultation proceeds.
| Stage | Proposed timing |
| Public consultation | 21 October – 20 November 2026 |
| Feedback submitted to the TCCT | 23 November 2026 |
| Notification signed by the chairman | By 4 December 2026 |
| Expected commencement | 18 December 2026 |
According to the reporting, the draft covers five categories of charges, including service fees, revenue-sharing arrangements, waiting fees and other benefits collected by the platform. It addresses how gross profit (GP) arrangements are calculated and what justification a platform must give when it raises or lowers its charges. Platforms would need to set out the factors behind their fees, and to support any change with relevant information, which may include operating costs and technology investment.
The obligations are aimed at platforms with market power rather than every operator. The draft reportedly treats a market share of at least 10% and up to 33% as indicating market power, and a share above 33% as dominance, with the commission also applying its own assessment criteria. These figures are working indicators for the purposes of the fee notification, not the general test of dominance under the Act. That test is set by a separate commission notification, which currently treats a business as dominant if it holds at least 50% of a market and has annual turnover of THB 1 billion or more, or if it is one of the top three operators with a combined share of at least 75%, excluding any of them with less than 10% of the market or turnover below THB 1 billion. A further TCCT draft would lower the single-firm thresholds to 33% and THB 500 million, and in fast-moving and technology-platform markets would replace fixed figures with a qualitative assessment. Specialist reporting also indicates that platforms with a share of at least 10% would need to give advance notice of fee increases, and that dominant platforms would need the commission’s approval before raising fees. If that approval step survives the consultation, the regime will go further than disclosure. How the final text defines the relevant market, and how it measures share within it, will matter as much as the thresholds themselves. A platform with a modest national share may hold a commanding position in a particular province or service category, and the reverse is also possible.
The commission has said that it received 37 platform-related complaints in 2026 up to early October, that about 90% of complaints from riders and restaurants concerned GP charges, and that its checks identified eight fee increases by the largest ride-hailing and delivery platforms between April and August 2026. Some complaints go beyond the headline commission: compulsory participation in promotional campaigns, mandatory order batching, and the way charges are applied when several orders are assigned along a single route. They show that the commercial relationship between a platform and its partners involves far more than a single percentage.
GP: a fee is not the same as a profit
In the Thai platform economy, “GP” is shorthand for the platform’s share of a transaction. Contractual definitions vary between operators, so it is worth working through a simple example.
A customer orders THB 500 of food. The platform deducts a 25% commission, leaving the restaurant THB 375 before any other adjustments. The platform’s GP is THB 125, but that figure is revenue, and it has to cover payment processing, promotions, customer acquisition, technology, support and the other costs of running the service. How much of it is profit depends on the contract and on how the platform allocates those costs.
Platforms have reportedly made exactly this point to the TCCT, and it deserves to be taken seriously. It does not, however, settle the competition question. A platform can incur genuine costs and still impose terms that warrant scrutiny, and a high commission is not in itself evidence of abuse. The more useful questions are practical ones:
- What does the platform provide in return for the fee, and what does the fee cover?
- Can the platform raise the fee without meaningful explanation?
- Can a restaurant or driver realistically decline the new terms?
- Are partners required to join promotions or accept particular job-allocation arrangements?
- Would the platform be able to sustain these conditions in a market with real competitive pressure?
The draft appears designed to produce evidence on these points. That is a more considered approach than declaring one commission rate fair and another unfair, and it avoids assuming that a single rate could suit every platform, location and type of order.
Why drivers and restaurants have limited room to negotiate
Ride-hailing and delivery platforms operate in multi-sided markets. A ride-hailing app connects passengers with drivers; a delivery app connects customers, restaurants and riders, while controlling the transaction and the allocation of work between them. Each group’s reason to use the platform depends on how many of the others are already there.
These network effects explain much of the sector’s success, and they also explain why leaving a large platform can be costly. A restaurant is free to stop using an app, but in doing so it may lose access to a large share of its delivery customers. A driver can register with a second platform, yet the alternative may offer fewer jobs, less predictable earnings or thin demand in the driver’s area. With more than 400,000 riders active in the market, by the TCCT’s own estimate, these are not marginal concerns.
This is where formal freedom of contract and real bargaining power part ways. The regulatory concern is whether a platform’s position allows it to set terms without the discipline that competition would normally impose. Charging a fee for a valuable service raises no such concern on its own.
Thailand already has a platform competition framework
The ride-hailing proposal builds on existing rules. The TCCT’s guidelines on competition in multi-sided and e-commerce platforms, issued under the Trade Competition Act, took effect on 25 March 2026. They address the relationship between platform operators and the businesses that sell through them. Practices within their scope include:
- unfair or unjustified differences in how business partners are treated;
- excessive charges imposed on partners;
- restrictions on how sellers price their products;
- algorithms or other mechanisms that limit a product’s visibility;
- preferential treatment of the platform’s own products or services; and
- conditions requiring sellers to use particular service providers.
The guidelines do not make each of these practices unlawful in every case. Whether conduct infringes the Act still depends on the market, the facts and a proper legal assessment.
The new proposal reflects the commission’s view that ride-hailing and on-demand delivery need more specific treatment. In a single delivery order, the same platform may collect a commission from the restaurant, a delivery fee from the customer and a share of the rider’s earnings, while also deciding who receives the job and which promotions apply. Those mechanics differ from an online marketplace’s, and the October reporting indicates that Shopee, Lazada and similar marketplaces will remain under a separate framework.
The direction of travel is significant. Thai regulators are beginning to distinguish between platform models and the particular competition risks each one creates, rather than treating every digital platform alike. The two sets of rules overlap in their principles, but their scope and legal basis differ, and the final notification should make clear how they relate to one another.
Is counting competitors enough?
Thailand’s mobile market offers a useful comparison. Since the True–DTAC merger, the market has been served by two major network groups, AIS and True Corporation. Whether two operators are “enough” has been debated at length, and the NBTC’s own analysis over the years has treated the question as one of effective competition: whether the market produces reasonable prices, service quality and investment, which a headcount of operators cannot answer on its own. The telecoms rules rest on a different statute and history, so the parallel has limits, but the underlying question carries over well.
Ride-hailing and delivery have a similar shape. In announcing its earlier work, the TCCT described these markets as having consolidated around two large platforms. A Thai consumer may still have several apps on their phone, including Grab, LINE MAN and Bolt, but the number of apps says little about how much pressure each one places on the others. Four questions help:
- Are the services genuinely interchangeable? In central Bangkok, switching between apps may be easy. On an island, in a provincial town or late at night, one platform may be the only one with drivers nearby.
- Can drivers realistically switch? Being registered on two apps matters less than whether both offer comparable demand and earnings.
- Can restaurants switch? Listing on a second platform rarely replaces the customers lost by leaving the first, since each has its own user base, promotions and fee structure.
- Does the platform hold something rivals cannot easily replicate? A large customer base, a dense driver network, transaction data and substantial promotional budgets are hard for smaller competitors to match.
None of this means that a large platform is abusing its position. Scale is often the reward for efficiency and good service. It does mean that competition should be judged by the alternatives actually available to customers and partners, which is the logic behind the draft’s focus on market power.
Phuket airport: competition and access are separate questions
Anyone who has landed in Phuket will know that getting a ride-hailing car from the terminal is not always straightforward. In March 2026, Phuket International Airport clarified restrictions on drivers waiting for passengers or accepting app bookings in certain areas, citing safety, the orderly management of transport services and the need to stop unauthorised operators soliciting passengers. At the same time, Grab offers an official airport pickup service there.
It is tempting to ask whether the new TCCT rules will change this. On the information available, they will not do so directly. The draft concerns how platforms set and justify their fees. Access to airport premises, designated pickup points and transport licensing are governed by different rules and different decision-makers.
A competition issue could arise if an airport operator or another business used its position to exclude rival platforms without objective justification. Establishing that would require its own analysis, including the legal basis for the restrictions, whether they apply equally to comparable operators, and the terms on which particular platforms have been granted access. It would be premature to call Phuket’s arrangements unlawful simply because one platform has access and another does not, and equally premature to assume they raise no competition concern at all.
There is also a threshold question. Phuket International Airport is operated by Airports of Thailand, a state enterprise, and Section 4(2) of the Trade Competition Act excludes state enterprises acting under law or a Cabinet resolution where this is necessary for national security, the public interest, the interests of society or the provision of public utilities. Whether airport access decisions fall within that exclusion would need to be settled before any competition analysis could begin.
Phuket is best understood as an illustration of where fee regulation stops. Competition between apps and access to essential facilities are related, and for passengers they can feel like the same problem, but they call for different legal tools.
Marketplaces, retailers and hybrid models
The same principles extend into online retail, although the business models differ. Marketplaces such as Shopee, Lazada and AliExpress give sellers access to customers along with payment, logistics, advertising, search ranking and promotional tools. For a small business, that can mean reaching buyers nationwide without opening a single shop. It also means the marketplace sets many of the rules under which sellers compete: search placement drives sales, promotional participation affects visibility, and shipping arrangements shape the final price of an offer. Section 60 of the Trade Competition Act, which allows the commission to order a business to suspend, stop or change its conduct where there is sufficient evidence of an actual or threatened breach, is the basis for the current freeze covering e-commerce platforms including Shopee, Lazada and TikTok Shop, after checks found frequent GP increases; Shopee was reported to have raised its GP ten times since 2022 and Lazada seven times. An increase in commission is not, by itself, evidence of an infringement. The conduct surrounding a fee can be. In August 2026 the commission imposed an administrative fine on Shopee under Section 57(2) of the Act, finding that automatically enrolling merchants in promotional programmes, combined with burdensome conditions for leaving them, was an unfair use of market power. It reached that finding after defining the relevant market narrowly, as e-marketplace services in Thailand, rather than accepting the broader retail market Shopee had argued for.
Central offers an instructive contrast. A group of that kind may combine direct retail, its own online channels, supplier relationships, physical stores, warehousing and fulfilment, and in some cases third-party seller services. The useful distinction is between selling products and operating a platform on which others sell, rather than between online and offline. A business can occupy both roles at once. A marketplace that also sells its own goods has an intermediary role and a retail interest in the same market, which can raise questions about ranking, data and preferential treatment. A traditional retailer can equally hold significant market power; physical stores do not place a business outside competition law.
Hybrid retailers may be well placed to compete, drawing on established brands, physical infrastructure and the ability to combine online and in-store service. Marketplaces have their own strengths in seller breadth, data and aggregated demand. Neither model is inherently better. The aim of competition law should be to let them compete on their merits, without protecting traditional retail from online rivals or online platforms from traditional retail, and without allowing either to distort competition through the terms it imposes on those who depend on it.
What consumers can expect, and what could go wrong
For passengers and customers, the potential gains are clearer fares and surcharges, better explanations of cancellation and waiting fees, more reliable service and a wider real choice between platforms. Restaurants and riders stand to gain more predictable terms and a better understanding of why fees change. For online shoppers and sellers, the e-commerce guidelines should narrow the scope for unfair restrictions on visibility, pricing and logistics.
Expectations should be realistic. For now, the Section 60 freeze bars increases until early 2027. Once it lapses, a platform that raises its commission and gives a credible, well-documented explanation may satisfy the commission and keep the higher rate, subject to any approval requirement in the final text. An inadequate explanation could prompt the commission to look further, but the outcome would depend on the final rules and the evidence. Transparency improves the conditions for competition; it does not guarantee lower prices. Nor does regulation automatically raise them, although some compliance costs may be passed on to customers, restaurants or drivers.
Implementation will decide whether the framework works, and several risks should be addressed during the consultation:
- Compliance burdens that favour incumbents. Extensive reporting is easier for large platforms to absorb than for new entrants, which would cut against the commission’s stated aim of helping smaller operators grow.
- Transparency as paperwork. Detailed disclosures are of limited value if the regulator lacks the capacity to scrutinise them or the law offers no effective response to unfair conduct.
- Chilling legitimate investment. Platforms spend heavily on technology, logistics, payments and safety. Rules that ignore real differences in cost structure could discourage that spending.
- Restructured fees. If one category of charge attracts scrutiny, costs may migrate to another. Regulators will need to look at the substance of the commercial arrangement rather than the label on each fee.
- Protecting competitors instead of competition. A successful platform that offers lower prices or a more efficient service is competing on its merits. The concern arises only when market power is used to restrict competition through unfair conduct.
Finding the right balance
Thailand’s approach is developing along two tracks: sector-specific scrutiny of ride-hailing and delivery fees, and the broader e-commerce guidelines already in force. Both rest on the Trade Competition Act, although the reported court challenge will now test how far the Act allows the commission to go on fees. Together they point towards a more coherent view of competition in the digital economy.
Effective competition does not require a regulator to set prices. It does require more than the theoretical presence of rival apps. Platforms create real value through innovation and convenience, and their success should not in itself be a reason to intervene. Where a platform can impose terms on drivers, restaurants or sellers who have few practical alternatives, though, the competitive process deserves a closer look.
The measure of these rules will be whether they leave businesses room to innovate while ensuring that the gains of the digital economy are shared fairly among the people and businesses who make it work. Cheaper services may follow, but that is a possible outcome of healthier competition and should not be mistaken for its purpose. Much will depend on the final text, on how the commission enforces it, and on its ability to tell legitimate commercial practice apart from conduct that undermines competition.
Platform operators, merchants and investors in the sector should review the draft during the consultation window, which closes on 20 November 2026. Points worth watching include the final notification’s definitions of GP and the five charge categories, the method for calculating market share, how the new rules sit alongside the e-commerce guidelines, and the outcome of the court challenge.