Thailand’s Nuclear Energy Framework: Legal Reforms After Past Accidents

By John Formichella and Naytiwut Jamallsawat
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Thailand has intentionally overhauled its nuclear regulatory system, mainly based on lessons from past radiological incidents. As nuclear energy cautiously re-enters the national energy strategy—particularly through Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)—the legal framework now demonstrates a stronger policy commitment to public safety, transparency, and integrity.

This article explains how Thailand’s updated laws, regulations, and planning tools tackle historical safety issues and what this means for infrastructure developers and energy investors working in a high-compliance environment.


Learning from the Past: Regulatory Response to Previous Thai Nuclear Incidents

Thailand’s two most serious radiation-related events remain deeply embedded in the national memory:

  • Samut Prakan, 2000: A spent cobalt-60 medical device, improperly stored in a private warehouse, was dismantled by scrap workers. The radiation release went undetected for over two weeks. The result: three fatalities and radiation exposure to more than 1,800 residents.
  • Prachin Buri, 2023: A Cs-137 gauge went missing from a power plant and was later found melted down at a local scrap yard. Although no injuries were reported, the facility operator delayed notifying regulators, leading to criminal enforcement under the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act.

These incidents were not caused by reactor failure, but rather by weak source control, reporting delays, and insufficient public communication. Thailand’s modern legal response has focused squarely on correcting these shortcomings.


Strengthened Legal and Regulatory Framework:
Nuclear Energy for Peace Act (2016, amended 2019)

The 2016 Act—Thailand’s cornerstone nuclear statute—establishes a unified licensing regime and empowers the Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) as the country’s principal nuclear regulatory authority. Its provisions include:

  • Mandatory Licensing: All activities involving radioactive sources—possession, transport, import, export, use—require licensing under defined safety criteria.
  • Immediate Incident Reporting: Licensees must promptly report any loss, theft, or accident. Delays, such as in the 2023 case, are punishable by both administrative and criminal penalties.
  • Inspections and Enforcement: Regulators have wide authority to investigate, suspend, or revoke licenses and to prosecute violations. OAP officers may conduct unannounced inspections.
  • Public Protection Obligations: Facilities must maintain radiation protection programs and comprehensive emergency preparedness protocols.

These measures represent a material shift from the fragmented regime in place in 2000, where neither licensing oversight nor emergency coordination was centralized or enforceable.


Ministerial Regulations and Enforcement Practice

OAP has issued more than 50 implementing regulations and notices, including:

  • Secure Source Inventory Requirements
    Facilities must track radioactive materials from acquisition to disposal, reducing the risk of “orphan sources” like the device in the 2000 incident.
  • Facility Licensing Rules (e.g., B.E. 2563/2020)
    Operators must demonstrate design safety, staff training, waste handling protocols, and site-specific risk mitigation plans.
  • Emergency Response Plans
    Each licensed entity must develop response strategies in alignment with the national radiological emergency framework.

Thailand is also a party to international conventions on early notification of nuclear accidents and mutual assistance, further integrating global safety standards into its legal architecture.


Thailand’s Power Development Plan and Nuclear Integration

Thailand’s Power Development Plan (PDP 2024–2037) cautiously reintroduces nuclear power into the national energy mix. Instead of large-scale reactors, the PDP proposes a limited rollout of two Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) by the mid-2030s, reflecting a conservative approach to capacity, public risk, and technical oversight.

Strategic International Cooperation

A critical component of Thailand’s nuclear development strategy is its cooperation with countries that maintain strong nuclear safety records, including:

  • United States:
    Collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has focused on SMR design safety, licensing frameworks, and regulator training.
  • France and Japan:
    The OAP has engaged in joint technical workshops on post-Fukushima reactor oversight and radiation emergency preparedness with counterparts from France and Japan—countries known for high regulatory maturity.
  • South Korea and China:
    Thailand has signed MOUs with both countries on nuclear energy cooperation, technical assistance, and human capacity development. Korea’s export model of SMRs and nuclear safety training has been of particular interest.
  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
    Thailand continues to work closely with the IAEA, having hosted Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions and committed to infrastructure readiness assessments. Thailand’s legal framework is benchmarked against IAEA safety standards.

These relationships serve both technical and diplomatic purposes, as they build institutional capacity while signaling to the public and private sectors that nuclear deployment in Thailand will not proceed without global alignment on safety.


Why Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): Safety by Design

Thailand’s choice to pursue SMRs over legacy reactor designs is a calculated safety decision, particularly in a region where public concerns are still shaped by the Chernobyl (1986)Three Mile Island (1979), and Fukushima (2011) nuclear accidents.

1. Passive Safety Systems
SMRs are often designed with passive safety features that enable reactors to cool without operator intervention or external power. This significantly lowers the risk of a core meltdown—one of the main failures at Fukushima, where power loss disabled critical cooling systems.

2. Underground and Modular Containment
Most SMR designs feature underground containment structures, reducing potential radiation exposure to the surrounding environment. This stands in contrast to Chernobyl’s  RBMK reactor, which lacked a containment building entirely, was a major factor in the scale of its radiological release.

3. Lower Power Output and Core Size
SMRs operate at a fraction of the output of conventional reactors (generally under 300 MW). This smaller core size significantly reduces the amount of fissile material and associated thermal energy, offering a lower-risk profile than reactors like Three Mile Island Unit 2, which operated at 900 MW and experienced a partial core meltdown.

4. Factory-Based Manufacturing and Transportable Design
The modular nature of SMRs enables them to be fabricated off-site and transported to their final location, thereby minimizing on-site construction risks. By contrast, many historical reactor failures involved custom-built systems with inconsistent quality assurance across large-scale construction phases.

Through these safety and design advancements, SMRs address the technical and psychological concerns associated with legacy reactors directly. They are widely considered next-generation solutions that not only enhance containment and emergency response capabilities but also help restore public confidence in nuclear power as a viable, manageable energy source.


Implications for Investors and Licensees

Thailand’s legal posture is both opportunity-rich and compliance-heavy. Key takeaways for stakeholders include:

  • Regulatory Accountability:
    Operators and developers must adhere to licensing, inspection, and reporting requirements under the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act and related regulations. Failures—such as not reporting lost materials—are now met with strict enforcement actions.
  • Public Engagement Requirements:
    SMR development will require extensive environmental and community impact review, including public hearings. Securing a social license is now a legal prerequisite, not just a political consideration.
  • Risk Allocation and Insurance:
    Thailand is reviewing draft legislation on civil nuclear liability. Until then, project proponents should secure suitable risk coverage and indemnification measures in anticipation of strict liability standards.
  • Strategic Positioning:
    Investors with a proven safety track record and willingness to engage transparently with regulators and communities will be well-positioned. Conversely, any perception of downplaying issues or regulatory evasion is likely to lead to significant reputational and legal risks.

Conclusion

Thailand’s nuclear law reforms and energy planning instruments represent a clear pivot toward regulatory discipline, public transparency, and international benchmarking. The country’s cautious, safety-first approach—shaped by the legacy of past radiological accidents—prioritizes public trust, institutional readiness, and cross-border alignment with the world’s most experienced nuclear nations.

By pursuing Small Modular Reactors and embedding global safety standards into law, Thailand is taking a measured but determined step into nuclear energy—one built not only on necessity, but on accountability. For investors and developers, the opportunity lies not simply in project delivery, but in demonstrating leadership in regulatory compliance and public safety.

To read more from the authors or explore additional legal insights on energy and infrastructure, visit: Formichella & Sritawat – Data Centers and Nuclear Energy

The information provided here is for discussion and informational purposes only. It is crucial to note that nothing in this article should be or can be relied on as legal advice. Given the potential legal complexities, it is always advisable to seek professional legal counsel.

For any questions, you may contact Formichella & Sritawat at [email protected]

© Formichella & Sritawat Attorneys at Law


About the Authors

John Formichella

John Formichella, a founding partner at Formichella & Sritawat, previously worked as in-house counsel for the EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) contractor on the balance of plant and the Owner’s Engineer for the nuclear island of the Taiwan Fourth Nuclear Power Project.

Naytiwut Jamallsawat, a partner at Formichella & Sritawat, is not only a distinguished authority in Telecommunications, Media, and Technology law, but also advises extensively on power plant regulations and licensing in Thailand, advising on a multitude of power plant projects under various government incentives for development of power stations.